EDITORIAL NOTES.

Goods (bona addicuntur) are ad-judicated to the adjudicatee at judicial, sales under the French and Louisiana
law.1
E. T. MERRICK.
New Orleans, La.

EDITORIAL NOTES.
By G. W. P.

The case of O'Neil v. The State of Vermont, which is
criticized by a correspondent in this number of THE AMERICAN LAW REGISTER AND REVIEW, is a decision of great
interest and importance. Many vital questions of constitutional law are discussed more or less elaborately by Mr. Justice BLATCHFORD, who delivers the opinion of the majority,
by Mr. Justice FIELD, who files a dissenting opinion, and
by Mr. Justice HARLAN, in whose separate dissenting opinion Mr. Justice BREWER concurs. But perhaps no aspect
of the case is more interesting than that which it presents
when considered as a decision relating to the Federal power
over interstate commerce. An examination of the opinions
reveals the fact that the Court is divided upon a comparatively simple question belonging to this all-important branch
of our constitutional law; and it seems impossible to escape
the conclusion that the tribunal which had but a short time
ago .settled this doctrine upon a satisfactory basis is once
more at sea, in regard to it, the views of the individual justices being.well-nigh hopelessly at variance with one another.
1 See Savigny, Vol. 6, Berlin Ed., 1847, p. 257, Sec. 280; also 4th
Vol., p. 532. Merlin Reportoire verbis "a'judicataire et adjudication,"
also verbis "Chose jugde ;" Mackledey, Brussels Ed., 1846, pp. 239 aid
240, Partie Speciale Sec., 505. See the accurate definitions in Burrill's
Law Dictionary of adjudicatio and adjudication. See Res judicata, Chapter 2, pp. 5 to ii of Bigelow on Estoppel.
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The profession began to suspect the existence of this
state of affairs when the decision in Maine v. The Grand
Trunk Railway was handed down, a decision which was
commented upon in the March number of this periodical.
The suspicion received confirmation when the Court decided
Ficklen v. The Shelby Taxing District, which Mr. FRANCIS COPE HARTSHOR,\E criticized in a contribution to the
July number. At the conclusion of his remarks Mr. HARTSHORNE used this language: "There is much food for reflection in the thought suggested by the decisions of the
Court for the last year, namely, how great a revolution of
doctrine may result from a few changes in fersonnel." And
now comes the case of O'Neil v. The State of Vermont,
which substitutes certainty for suspicion on this point, and
enables us to quote Mr. Justice FIELD in support of the view
suggested by Mr. HARTSHORNE in the foregoing quotation.
Says the learned Justice in his dissenting opinion: "When
Bowman v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. was decided, Justices
MATTHEWS, MILLER and BRADLEY were members of this
Court and concurred in the decision. And when Leisy v.
Hardin was decided the latter two justices were still members and concurred in that decision. These justices were
distinguished for their ability and learning, and it was the
occasion of great pride to them that they had contributed
by their labors to establish that freedom of interstate commerce from State interference which made the different
States, commercially, one country.
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These

three justices are no longer members of this Court, bfit
since they ceased to be members there has been no adjudication by it until the decision in this case, which, in any
respect, changes its previous decisions upon the exclusive
power of Congress over interstate commerce." Although we
do not agree with the learned Justice, that this is the first
case which marks a departure from sound doctrine, we cannot but acquiesce when he intimates that in the decision of
questions of interstate commerce the country is already beginning to feel the loss of those great jurists, Mr. Justice
MILLER and Mr. Justice BRADLEY. In the case, underdis-
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cussion it is not so much the decision upon the question
of interstate commerce that excites surprise (leaving the
other points of the case out of consideration), as it is the
mode of approaching the problem and the manner in
which its solution is attempted in the majority opinion.
A citizen of New York was engaged in the retail liquor
business, which was and is a lawful occupation under the
laws of that State, and his commodities were legitimate
subjects of commerce. In the ordinary course of business
lie received from the citizens of another State orders by
mail, telegraph, and express for small quantities of these
commodities accompanied (in the case of express orders) by
receptacles for the liquor, upon which the freight charges
were prepaid by the customers. These orders were executed, the receptacles were filled but in no way disguised, and
were then shipped through the same express carrier back to
the customers, the dealer taking the usual precaution, as the
customers were unknown to him, of sending the commodities C. 0. D. It turned out that the State into which the
goods were thus sent-Vermont-had enacted a law making
it penal, except in certain cases which do not affect the
present question, to "manufacture, sell, furnish, or give
.. spirituous or intoxicating liquor,"away .....
under which description the above-mentioned subjects of
commerce fell. The New York dealer was arrested under
this statute, in consequence of an affidavit of complaint
made before a Vermont justice of the peace. The patent
defects in this document are ably discussed by our correspondent. Before the justice of the peace he was convicted
and sentenced to pay a fine of over $9,000 with about $500
costs, and to be imprisoned for one month-the imprisonment to be prolonged, in the event of non-payment of the
required sums within the month, for ,a period of seventynine years. A jury on appeal subsequently reduced the
number of offences, so that the sentence of the County Court
was for the insignificant fine of $6,000 and, in default as
above, for the trifling term of fifty-four years. On appeal
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the Supreme Court of Vermont affirmed the judgment
below.
Leaving aside the questions as to whether this was a
humane and usual or a cruel and unusual punishment, and
whether or not the proceedings under the Vermont statute
amounted to "due process of law," it will be profitable to
mark the ultimate fate of the contention made on behalf of
the convicted dealer before the Supreme Court of Vermont,
that the Vermont statute if applicable to this case was an
infringement upon the exclusive right of Congress to'regulate interstate commerce. That tribunal considered the
question whether the title to the subjects of commerce
passed to the purchaser before transit began or when they
were delived by the carrier in Vermont. The Court decided
that "there was a completed executory contract of sale in
New York, but the completed sale was, or was to be, in this
State."
The opinion then proceeded: "Concerning the
claim that Section 8 of the Federal Constitution, conferring
upon Congress the exclusive right to regulate commerce
among the States, has application, it isszfcient to say that
ng regulation of,or interference with, interstate commerce is
attempfted.1 This is a form' of argument only too often found
in the utterances of courts of last resort or of disputants
whose opponents have no opportunity of replying to them.
Although the thought is not expressed in so many words,
we seem to feel that the Vermont Court had in mind some
such idea as that a transaction which was consummated in
Vermont could not be an interstate commerce transaction;
and that the constitutional provision would have had application only in case the sale had been completed in New
York. Groundless as such a view is, it constitutes the only
I Mr. Justice BLATCHrORD, in delivering the opinion of the majority,
contends that this clause was intended by the Vermont Court to be
applicable only to two seizure cases arising out of the same transaction
and decided at the same time. It is at least doubtful whether such was
the meaning of the Vermont Court. If it was, then that Court decided
against O'Neil's contention that the act was a regulation of commerce
without even attempting to justify so remarkable a decision.

EDITORIAL NOTES.

trace of a reason to be found in the opinion for the conclusion which we have italicized above.
When the cause reached the Supreme Court of the
United States, it was assigned as error, ilecr alia, that the
Vermont Court had not held the statute void as in conflict
with the Commerce Clause. But a majority of that tribunal
decided that "the only question considered by the Supreme
Court, in its opinion, in regard to the present case, was
whether the liquor in question was sold by O'Neil at Rutland
or at Whitehall, so as to fall within or without the statute
of Vermont, and the Court arrived at the conclusion that the
completed sale was in Vermont. That does not involve any
Accordingly the writ of error was disFederal question."
missed for want of jurisdiction. Mr. Justice FIELD, in his
powerful opinion, demonstrates the unsoundness of this position, when, after referring to the language of the majority
opinion just quoted, he says, "To this I answer, that before
the State Court could reach the question whether the sale
fell under the law of Vermont, it had to determine whether
the sale was completed in that State or in New Yorkwhether, therefore, an executory sale of goods in New
York, completed in Vermont, was or was not a transaction
of interstate commerce, and until that question, which was
a Federal one, was disposed of, the alleged State question
could not be considered. But that the commercial question
was brought to the attention of the Supreme Court of Vermont, was argued by counsel there and passed upon by that
court, does not rest as an inference from the facts necessarily
involved: it appears from its opinion and the official report
The Federal question being thus before the
of the case."
Court, that tribunal has no right, he contends, to refuse to
decide it, and, moreover, he urges that the decision, when
rendered, should be adverse to the constitutionality of the
Vermont statute, The transaction under consideration embodies "all the elements which 'constitute interstate commerce.'.' "As said by this Court in Welton v. State of
Missouri,' com merce.' comprehends intercourse for the pur'91 U. S., 275, 280.
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poses of trade in any and all its forms, including the transportation, purchase, sale and exchange of commodities
between the citizens of our country and the citizens or subjects of other countries and between the citizens of different
States.' "

Mr. Justice HARLAN, with whom concurred Mr. Justice BREWER, agreed with Mr. Justice FIELD that a Federal
question was necessarily before the Court and used the following language: "The decision that the sales were consummated in Vermont, and consequently that the defendant violated the laws of that State in doing what he did
there, by his agents, is not in itself sufficient to support
the judgment, except upon the theory that he had no right,
under the Constitution of the United States, to send the
liquors into Vermont to be there delivered in the original
packages." These Justices were, however, of opinion that
the sales in question "were not in any fair sense transactions of interstate commerce protected by the Constitution
of the United States against the laws of Vermont"
"What he (the defendant) did was a mere device to evade
the statutes enacted by Vermont.
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The doctrine

relating to 'original packages' of merchandise sent from
one State to another State does not embrace a business of
that character." This would seem to be a dangerous view
of the case. Aside from the fact that there was nothing
on the record to show that the defendant even knew of the
existence of the foreign statute, it is to be remarked that
the law will be deprived of all certainty if the Court undertakes to scrutinize in each transaction the motives which
induced the person who claims the protection of the Commerce Clause to engage in interstate business. Such a doctrine could be applied, should the Court feel so inclined, to
transactions involving any of the various branches of commerce, and there would be no assurance in a given case
that the Court would not be pleased to consider that the
complainant did what he did merely to "evade" the State
legislation. The view of Mr. Justice FIELD is a satisfactory answer to this contention. "Nor can it make any
40
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difference," he says, "what motives may be imputed to
the parties on the one side in selling, and on the other in
purchasing the goods; the only inquiry which can be considered is, were the goods bought and sold subjects of lawful commerce, for if so they were, in their transportation
between the parties - citizens of different States-until
their delivery to the purchaser or consignee in the completion of the contracts of sale, under the protection of the
commercial power of Congress."
Such is the position of the Court on one of the points
in this remarkable case. A cause comes before it necessarily involving, as it seems to us, a Federal question. The
majority dismiss it for want of jurisdiction. Three judges
are of opinion that the jurisdiction exists. Two of them
would determine the question adversely to the appellant
because they suspect that his motives have been bad. The
other brings principle and authority to bear on the case
and concludes that his brethren are overturning a wellsettled and all important doctrine and depriving a citizen
of the United States of the protection guaranteed by the
Constitution.
In the meantime O'Neil has either paid the enormous
fine or he has been thrown into prison for the rest of his
natural life.

